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Robert Rasche, senior vice president and director
of Research—for their assistance and comments,
but I retain full responsibility for errors.
THE NEW ECONOMY
Many observers, economists and others, have
devoted considerable attention and analysis to
the phenomenon known as the “New Economy”
and its implications for growth. This discussion
has focused on the resurgence of growth in labor
productivity in the second half of the 1990s and
the sustained high productivity growth through
the economic slowdown of 2001. One important
question, not satisfactorily resolved as yet, is why
productivity growth surged after the low produc-
tivity years from roughly 1974 to 1994. Whatever
the reason, the productivity surge does seem real;
looking forward, the question is whether the U.S.
Economy has truly entered a period of sustained
rapid productivity growth.
This question is fundamental to the future
economic wellbeing of our society, since the rate of
growth of labor productivity is what sustains the
growth of our standard of living, which we meas-
ure as the average consumption per person. The
question is also central to assessments of the likely
futureperformanceofthefinancialmarkets.Unfor-
tunately, because no one appears to have produced
a convincing analysis of the causes of the 20-year
slowdown in productivity, it is necessary to
exercise caution with respect to prognostications
about sustained high productivity growth in the
future. Such forecasts are necessarily imprecise.
Discussions of productivity and economic
growth most often concentrate on invention and
M
y purpose today is to look ahead
to the longer-run performance of
the U.S. economy. Many aspects
of our future society depend on
how high the growth rate of GDP turns out to be.
The profitability of firms, and therefore trends
in stock prices, will depend in good part on the
U.S. growth rate. So also will the average tax rate
we pay; given that many government outlays are
somewhat fixed in real terms, such as require-
ments for national defense, the higher the growth
rate of GDP, the lower will be the average tax rate
on the economy to yield the revenue required to
service these commitments. Lower tax rates create
more incentives for work and investment, both
of which promote higher economic growth. Econ-
omic growth itself generates growth in govern-
ment revenues that can yield budget surpluses
that raise national saving and therefore national
investment in productivity enhancing capital.
So, my subject today is long-run growth. My
framework is a simple one. GDP growth depends
on the growth of hours of labor input and the
growth of output per hour—what we call “labor
productivity.” I’ll talk briefly about productivity
growth, but will concentrate most of my remarks
on trends with regard to labor hours. This choice
of topic reflects my view that the subject of labor
hours has received insufficient attention; the topic
of productivity growth has garnered most of the
attention.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis—especiallyinnovation,andthoseareobviouslyimportant.The
functioning of the labor market is also extremely
important; for one thing, a labor market that fails
to place the right workers in the right jobs will
fail to obtain the full benefits of workers’ skills and
aptitudes that create high productivity growth.
Moreover, to make clear an obvious point, if
over time people work fewer hours per week and
retire at increasingly younger ages, labor input
to the economy will grow more slowly, or even
shrink. Declining labor input can easily cancel
out improvements in productivity growth, leav-
ing GDP growth unchanged, or even lower than
before. I’m going to concentrate the rest of my
remarks on what is happening on this front but
will not discuss in any detail policy issues relat-
ing to such issues as hours of work or the retire-
ment age.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Growth of consumption per capita depends
on a number of factors, each of which can be
analyzed separately to a degree. The amount of
total consumption depends on the level of total
output, or real GDP, less the amount of GDP
devoted to investment and government spending
on goods and services. Although there are many
interesting and important issues concerning pri-
vate investment and the choices governments
make, what I want to focus on is the growth of
total GDP and the role of the labor market in
advancing, or retarding, that growth.
Over the long run, hours of labor input are
determined primarily by the growth of the total
population. Given population growth, productiv-
ity growth is the source of sustained increases in
the standard of living in a society. Nevertheless,
over periods that can be decades long, other factors
can and do affect the level of per capita consump-
tion—that is, these other factors can generate
increases or decreases in the growth rate of our
standard of living for a period of some years. Such
factors include, first, the fraction of the output
of our economy that we choose to consume (or
viewed from the flip side of the coin, the fraction
of total output that we choose to save); second,
the average number of hours each employed per-
son in the economy works per year; and, third, the
fraction of the total population actively employed.
In the short run, the per capita consumption
of a society can be increased by increasing the
share of total output that is consumed. Societies
sometimes pursue policies deliberately designed
to shift output from investment to consumption,
precisely to obtain the short-run advantage of
larger consumption. From a longer-run perspec-
tive, such policies are counterproductive, because
the share of output that is available for investment
in physical capital is correspondingly reduced.
Hence over time the capital-labor ratio in the
economy falls (the reverse of “capital deepening”)
and per capita output is reduced. Economies, and
individuals, that do not save and invest reduce
their future output and therefore deprive them-
selves of future consumption.
The average number of hours that employees
work per year is also a choice variable for society.
Over the past century, as the standard of living in
our economy has increased, workers have chosen
to substitute more leisure for other consumption
opportunities. They have done so through shorter
workweeks and longer vacation periods. Six-day
workweeks are long gone. Interestingly, though,
in the United States, average hours per workweek
stopped falling in about 1940.
In other societies, the decline in average
hours has gone much further than in the United
States. Workers in these societies enjoy more paid
holidays, longer vacation allotments and, in some
cases, shorter workweeks than here. In some
places, notably continental European societies,
the trend toward greater consumption of leisure
has been legislated. This trend, apparent in many
countries over the past half century, has reduced
the standard of living as measured by the average
level of consumption per person relative to what
it would have been without the reduction in work
hours.
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EMPLOYMENT/POPULATION
RATIO IN THE UNITED STATES
Let’s consider trends in the employed fraction
of the population and some implications of those
trends for the growth potential of our economy.
Too few people seem to realize just how different
the situation in the United States is in this regard
from many other countries.
I will focus primarily on the 20-to-64 year
age group. This is not the conventional measure
that is usually employed in such discussions.
The data that are commonly cited refer either to
the “working age” population—currently defined
as 16 years of age and older in the United States,
or the “prime working age” population—16
through 64 years of age.
My exclusion of the teenage population from
this discussion is deliberate. First, the choice of
age 16 in our employment statistics is an arbitrary
convention. Before 1967 the employment statis-
tics compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
were based on ages 14 and older. The decision to
redefine the statistics presumably reflected the
idea that as our society became less agrarian and
a higher percentage of jobs required more skilled
labor, the principal activity of 14 to16 year olds
had become full-time school rather than in full-
time employment.
The skill requirements of our labor market
have continued to increase, perhaps at an accel-
erating rate, over the years since the labor force
was redefined. Today, employment prospects
and standards of living are bleak for the person
lacking a high school education. Income differen-
tials between high school and college graduates
have increased substantially over the past decade.
Consequently, an increasingly large fraction of
those in the 16 to 19 age group are in school, and
it makes sense to concentrate labor force analysis
on those age 20 and above.
Over the past 40 years in the United States
there has been a steady upward trend in the
employment/population ratio of those 20 to 64
years old. Starting from about 64 percent in 1960,
the employed share of this population group
increased to about 76 percent in 2001. This trend
persisted—indeed was most prominent—during
the slow productivity growth period from the
mid-70s to the mid-90s. From 1974 to 1994, the
employment ratio rose from 68 to 75 percent,
thereby supporting the growth of the average
standard of living in the United States during
this period.
A principal source of the rising employment
ratio during the 1970s and 1980s was the remark-
able rate of integration of female workers into
employment. Starting from only 40 percent in
1960, the employed fraction of females aged 20
to 64 increased to 69 percent by 1997, after which
it leveled off. In contrast, the employ-
ment/population ratio for males aged 20 to 64,
which was 89 percent in 1960, declined from the
mid-1970s through the mid-1980s to the low 80
percent level, around which it has fluctuated
without trend ever since. Much of the decline in
the male employment ratio was a consequence
of earlier retirement.
Incidentally, when I was teaching I used to
enjoy telling my beginning economics students
that the social revolution that so dramatically
increased the fraction of women at work made
possible the early retirement of men. That line
rarely got even an embarrassed giggle. But it
really is true that without the production gains
from the rising fraction of women at work our
society could not have afforded increasingly
early retirement for men.
The net result of these trends is that the
employment/population ratio for the entire pop-
ulation aged 20 to 64 increased from 64 percent
in 1960 to 76 percent in 2001. This experience
contradicts a popular hypothesis that there is only
a fixed amount of work opportunities available
in the economy. From that perspective, public
policies should discourage or exclude certain
groups of individuals from employment in order
to “make room” for other groups of workers,
particularly younger workers. An alternative
hypothesis is that well designed public policies
that promote maximum sustainable economic
growth will provide an ample supply of employ-
ment opportunities for the entire available popu-
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that government should pursue policies that cre-
ate employment opportunities for everyone will-
ing and able to work.
I’ve hinted that early retirement is a disturb-
ing characteristic of employment trends over the
last several decades. Indeed, the decline in the
employment/population ratio of males was heav-
ily concentrated in the 55-to-64 age group. In the
1960s, the employment ratio of these individuals
was over 80 percent, less than 10 percentage
points lower than that of the entire male popula-
tion ages 20 to 64. By 2001, the employment ratio
of this group was only 65 percent, almost 20 per-
centage points less than the employment ratio
for the entire male population ages 20 to 64.
I find the substantial increase in early retire-
ment disturbing for several reasons. Individuals in
this age group have considerable work experience
and likely have accumulated substantial skills.
The improved health status of the population and
increased life expectancy might be expected to
yield longer rather than shorter working lives. In
the years to come, as the baby-boom generation
reaches normal retirement age, the fraction of the
total population at work to support those who are
retired will fall. The burden of the dependent pop-
ulation—both the young and those retired—on the
working population will grow. In my opinion, we
will have to consider whether the government
should adopt policies to increase incentives for
older workers to remain employed, perhaps in
part-time employment if that is preferred. In any
event, U.S. GDP growth will depend in part on
whether the trend to earlier retirement continues.
At the upper age definition of the labor force,
I confess that I am not altogether comfortable with
excluding individuals 65 years of age and older.
On a personal level, this definition suggests that
I should gracefully move aside, a prospect that
does not appeal to me in the immediate future.
Some individuals choose to participate in the
labor force well beyond age 65—Chairman
Greenspan, for example. Clearly, as seniors age,
relatively fewer individuals will choose to con-
tinue employment. It is unlikely that many nona-
genarians will be enticed to work regularly as
greeters at Wal-Mart!
In spite of age-discrimination laws, the abo-
lition of mandatory retirement provisions, and
increasing longevity, the fraction of individuals
65 and over employed has declined from around
17 percent in the mid-1960s to under 13 percent
in 2001. This trend primarily reflects a decline
in the employment/population ratio of males 65
years of age and older from over 25 percent in
the mid-1960s to the 15 to 17 percent range since
the mid-1980s. The employment/population ratio
of females 65 years and older has been trendless
at under 10 percent during the last 40 years.
You may recall that the last occupation to be
freed from mandatory requirement provisions
was tenured college professors—my previous
occupational experience. University administra-
tors expressed considerable apprehension at the
prospect of doddering professors refusing to retire
to make room in the tenure ranks for new, younger
blood. Such concerns proved baseless. Relatively
few academics have chosen to pursue full-time
teaching much beyond age 70.
Small as the employed fraction of the older
age groups is in the United States, we will see later
that it is substantial compared with the situation
in many other economies. This fact is significant
in a period of generally aging populations. With
increasing longevity, stable employment ratios
for relatively young age groups imply an increas-
ing dependency ratio: the ratio of the population
not employed to that employed. With low or
declining employment ratios for younger persons
remaining in school longer, the dependency ratio
is even larger. High dependency ratios cause sig-
nificant problems for the solvency of pay-as-you-
go government benefit programs for the senior
population, such as Social Security and Medicare
in the United States.
As the dependency ratio in a society increases,
ever-higher taxes on the employed fraction of the
population are required to maintain the solvency
of such programs. Higher marginal tax rates on
the working fraction of the population in turn can
reduce participation in employment and generate
even higher dependency ratios. Such situations
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this kind of problem in a number of economies
today, where there is an active debate on whether
various government programs that benefit sen-
iors can be maintained at existing levels, or how
the cost of such programs can be significantly
contained.
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS
There are striking differences across countries
in the utilization of the labor resources available.
I will focus first on the senior age group—those 65
and older. The Japanese economy has the highest
utilization of these workers. OECD data for Japan
start in 1968, at which time the employment ratios
for Japanese males and females 65 and over were
52 percent and 19 percent, respectively, more
than twice the corresponding employment ratios
in the United States at the same time. These ratios
in Japan trended downward over the last third of
the 20th century, reaching lows of 31 percent and
14 percent for males and females, respectively,
in 2001. While the negative trends in Japan were
stronger than in the United States, the overall
employment ratio for the senior population in
Japan remains about two-thirds higher than in
the United States.
Canadian data are available only for the period
since 1976. At that time, the employment ratios
for males and females 65 and over were 15 percent
and 4 percent, respectively. These fractions are
fairly comparable to those in the United States at
that same time: 19 percent and 8 percent, respec-
tively. As of 2001, the overall employment ratio
for those 65 and over is only 6 percent in Canada,
less than half that in the United States.
Since the mid-1980s, the employment ratios
for seniors in many countries have been extremely
low; 5 percent or less. For practical purposes, indi-
viduals of this age do not participate in employ-
ment in these countries. In Italy, this environment
has prevailed since at least 1970. In the United
Kingdom, data for previous years are not available.
In two countries, France and Germany, there were
strong negative trends in the employment ratios
of seniors, starting from substantially higher
employment/population ratios in the early 1970s.
For those 64 and younger, in 2001 the employ-
ment ratios are remarkably similar for the United
States, Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom.
For all these countries, the ratio of employment
to total population is approximately 75 percent.
The distribution of employment between males
and females in 2001 is roughly the same in the
United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom—
in the range of 79 to 83 percent for males and 67
to 69 percent for females. In Japan, male employ-
ment ratios are substantially higher, (87 percent)
and female employment ratios are substantially
lower (at 61 percent) than in the other three
countries.
Employment ratios for those 64 and younger
in Germany and France are 69 percent and 67
percent, respectively, while for Italy the overall
ratio is only 58 percent. In Italy there has been
no trend in these statistics over the period since
1980.
In France and Germany the overall employ-
ment ratio in 1980 was virtually identical to that
in the United States. This fact is particularly inter-
esting because in the 1960s and 1970s European
countries were cited as examples of “low unem-
ployment economies” that some regarded as
the envy of countries—in particular the United
States—said to be mired in chronically high
unemployment. Yet in 1980, regardless of the
reported unemployment numbers, the employed
“younger workers” in the three countries is the
same fraction of the population. In recent years,
the perspective on the unemployment situation
has reversed: Germany and France are considered
high unemployment economies, with reported
unemployment rates at or near double-digit levels,
while reported unemployment in the United
States has only recently crept up to 6 percent.
Comparisons of employment ratios provide
important information on how well countries
utilize their labor forces. Also important are com-
parisons across countries on average hours worked
per worker per year. Available data need to be
interpreted cautiously because of different statis-
tical sources in different countries. Nevertheless,
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appear to differ substantially in different countries.
According to OECD data, average annual hours
in 2001 in the United States were 1,821. Corres-
ponding data for some other countries were 1,532
for France, 1,467 for Germany and 1,346 for the
Netherlands. Data for 2001 are not available for
Canada and Japan, but data for 2000 indicate
that average annual hours in those two countries
are roughly the same as in the United States.
Over the past 20 years, average annual hours
have changed little in the United States and
Canada, but have declined significantly in the
other countries I’ve mentioned in this context.
To gain a feel for the quantitative importance of
the decline in average annual hours, for France
the decline between 1979 and 2001 amounted to
0.75 percent per year. That decline is significant
for an economy with a trend rate of growth in the
neighborhood of 2 percent per year. When we
consider both the decline in average annual hours
and the decline in the fraction of the population
employed, the two effects taken together add up
to a significant decline in labor input over time.
For many countries, the decline in labor input is
every bit as important, and in many cases more





RATIO IN THE UNITED STATES
Employment/population ratios in the United
States peaked prior to the most recent business
cycle peak in March 2001. The employment ratio
for males ages 20 to 64 declined from 84.7 percent
in June 2000 to 81 percent in April 2002, a decline
of 3.8 percentage points. The corresponding
employment ratio for females declined from 70.6
percent in April of 2000 to 68.6 percent in April
2003, a decline of 2.0 percentage points. The total
employment ratio for these age groups declined
from a high of 77.4 percent in April of 2000 to
74.6 percent in April 2003, a decline of 2.8 per-
centage points. The decline in the overall employ-
ment ratio for these age groups compares with an
increase of 2.2 percentage points in the overall
unemployment rate in the U.S. economy over the
same three-year period.
I don’t know whether, or how quickly, the U.S.
economy will return to the same high employ-
ment ratio experienced three years ago. But there
is little question that the labor force is significantly
underemployed today. Thus, it is reasonable to
expect that total hours could increase substantially
over the next several years. We have the potential
for labor hours to increase by 2 percent per year
for several years—1 percent per year from the
longer-run growth of the population, and another
1 percent per year to make up for the declines
during the recent slow-economy years. Adding
to the increase in labor hours the growth in labor
productivity of 2 to 2.5 percent per year gives us
the potential for real GDP growth of 4 to 4.5 per-
cent per year for several years.
These simple calculations make clear that
the United States has the potential to grow sub-
stantially over the next several years, and that a
major part of that growth will come from growth
of labor hours. Productivity growth is the critical
element of our longer-run future, but over the
immediate future labor utilization plays an equally
important role. We need to make sure that public
policy encourages productivity growth and full
utilization of labor, both for the immediate future
and for the long run. I think we’re on the right
track, and have ample reason to be optimistic.
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